Compactification of Extensive Forms and Belief in the Opponents' Future
  Rationality by Liu, Shuige
Compactification of Extensive Forms and Belief in the Opponents’ Future
RationalityI
Shuige Liu
School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-Ku 169-8050, Tokyo,
JAPAN; EPICENTER, School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, 6200 MD Maastricht, THE
NETHERLANDS
Abstract
We introduce an operation, called compactification, to reduce an extensive form to a compact one
where each decision node in the game tree can be assigned to more than one player. Motivated
by Thompson [17]’s interchange of decision nodes, we attempt to capture the notion of a faithful
representation of the chronological order of the moves in a dynamic game which plays a vital role
in fields like epistemic game theory. The compactification process preserves perfect recall and the
unambiguity of the order among information sets. We specify an algorithm, called leaves-to-root
process, which compactifies at least as many information sets as any other compactification process.
The compact extensive form provides an approach to avoid problems in dynamic game theory due
to the vague definition of the chronological order of the moves, for example, belief in the opponents’
future rationality (Perea [12])’s sensitivity to the specific extensive form representation. We show
that any strategy which can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality in a
minimal compact game if and only if it satisfies this property in every extensive form game which
is related to it via some compactification process.
Keywords: extensive forms, epistemic game theory, compactification, interchange of decision
nodes, belief in the opponents’ future rationality
1. Introduction
The extensive form has been acclaimed from the birth of game theory as a good model of the
salient features of dynamic interactive situations. Using the words of Kreps [7] (p.13), it captures
“the timing of actions that players may take and the information they will have when they must take
those actions.” In many cases, there are several extensive forms to represent the same chronological
order of the moves. That is, even if players actually make decisions simultaneously at some stage,
there are several orders to describe their moves in extensive forms. Though the orders are arbitrary,
two different extensive forms representing different orders can be transformed into each other via
Thompson [17]’s interchange of decision nodes. Hence some authors, for example, Thompson [17]
and Elmes and Reny [6], claim that the difference among multiple representations of a chronological
order is inessential.
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Yet it causes severe problems sometimes, for example, in dynamic epistemic game theory.
Epistemic game theory studies how a player may reason about other players before he starts to
play (see Perea [11], Dekel and Siniscalchi [5]). A primary criterion of a player’s reasoning in static
epistemic games is that he believes in the opponents’ rationality (Tan and Werlang [16]). It is
more complicated in dynamic games since it is not always possible for a player to believe that
his opponents had behaved rationally in the past (e.g., Binmore [4], Reny [13], [14]); further, his
interpretation of the opponents’ irrational behavior determines his beliefs about their future choices
(e.g., Battigalli [2], Battigalli and Siniscalchi [3], Perea [12]). Therefore, the order of information
sets matters since it specifies the meaning of past and future in a player’s reasoning. An example is
the notion of belief in the opponents’ future rationality (Perea [12]) which describes that a player
always believes at every stage of the game that her opponents will choose rationally at the stage
and in the future. The strategies optimal to the common belief in the opponents’ future rationality
is sensitive to the specific extensive form representation. In Section 6.2 of Perea [12], an example
shows that representations with different orders of information sets, albeit representing the same
dynamic situation, have different optimal strategies to the common belief in the opponents’ future
rationality.
Perea [12] claims that “if we insist that the order of the information sets in the dynamic games
faithfully represents the actual chronological order of the moves, then there is no problem in using
common belief in future rationality as a concept.” Yet the meaning of a faithful representation
is not specified there. Simultaneous moves are allowed and play an important role in Perea [12]’s
definition of extensive form, in which sense the formulation can be regarded as a “compactification”
of the standard one. However, there is no practical method to formulate the compactification
process.
Perea [12] also suggests that two extensive forms which can be transformed into each other
through Thompson [17]’s interchange of decision nodes can be regarded as representing the same
actual chronological order of the moves. Yet if we consider the “compactified” extensive forms,
it is not clear whether and how two “equivalent” (standard) extensive forms are related to a
compactified form. Neither there is an effective way to connect the distinct sets of strategies
selected in “equivalent” extensive forms. Worse, interchange of decision nodes sometimes destroys
the unambiguity of the order among information sets (an example is given in Perea [10], p.141)
and makes it impossible to select strategies optimal to any belief criterion which relies on the
well-defined notions of “past” and “future”.
In this paper, we attempt to solve those problems. We first give a formal definition of the
compact extensive form, where each decision node in the game tree can be assigned to more than
one player. We then introduce an operation, called compactification, where an information set
containing only the immediate successors of a node is “absorbed” into the node. It is motivated
by Thompson [17]’s interchange of decision nodes. Yet our compactification operation can be
conducted only if the immediate successors form an information set, while interchange of decision
nodes allows that the absorbed information set contains other nodes. This difference matters
essentially. In Section 5 we will show that the latter causes difficulties in our context.
By the compact extensive form and compactification operation, we attempt to capture the
process of constructing a faithful representation of the chronological order of the moves in dynamic
games. We show that compactification process preserves perfect recall and the unambiguity of
the order among information sets. A problem, however, is that the compactification process is
not order-independence. It is caused by the absorption of some information set h may hinder
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other information sets which is constituted by immediate successors of some node in h. We specify
an algorithm, called leaves-to-root process, which compactifies every information set that can be
absorbed.
The compact extensive form provides an approach to alleviate the sensitivity of belief in the
opponents’ future rationality (Perea [12]) to the specific extensive form representation. We show
that any strategy which can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality in a
minimal compact extensive form game, i.e., a game whose extensive form cannot be compactified
any more, if and only if the strategy satisfies this property in every extensive form game which can
be related to it via some compactification process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the compact extensive form.
Section 3 specifies the compactification operation. We also give some results on the properties of the
compactification process. Section 4 shows the main theorem about the minimal compact extensive
form games and the strategies optimal to common belief in the opponents’ future rationality.
Section 5 provides an alternative operation which is faithful to Thompson [17]’s interchange of
decision nodes and compare it with our compactification. Section 6 contains all the proofs.
2. Compact Extensive Forms
A compact extensive form is a tuple Γ = 〈T,≥; I, ı; {A}i∈I , α; {Hi}i∈I〉, where
1. (T,≥) is a finite tree, that is, T is a non-empty finite set of nodes and ≥is a partial order on
T satisfies (i) there is a smallest element t0 (called the root or the initial node) in T with respect
to ≥, and (ii) for each t ∈ T,≥ is a complete order on the predecessors of t.
We follow the auxiliary notations defined in Kreps and Wilson [8]. For each node x, we denote
by (Tx,≥) (sometimes only Tx for simplicity when no confusion is caused) the subtree of (T,≥)
with x as its root. We use Z to denote the set of terminal nodes in T and X the set of non-terminal
nodes (called the decision nodes), i.e., X = T\Z. For each x ∈ X, we denote by S(x) the set of
immediate successors of t, P (x) the set of predecessors of x, and pn(x) the n-th predecessor of x
(we stipulate that p0(x) = x).
2. I is the finite set of players. The function ı : X → 2I\{∅} assigns to each decision node a
set of players who have to make decision there. We say that a player i is active at a decision node
x ∈ X iff i ∈ ı(x). For each i ∈ I, we define Xi = {x ∈ X : i ∈ ı(x)}.
3. For each i ∈ I, Ai is a non-empty set of actions of i. We define Ai = Ai ∪ {}, where  is a
symbol not belonging to any Ai. By  we mean “no actions”. The function α : T\{t0} →
∏
i∈I Ai
assigning to each non-initial node the last profile of actions taken to reach it. It satisfies the
following conditions:
(3.1) αi(t) ∈ Ai (i.e., αi(t) 6= ) if and only if i ∈ ı(p1(t)). Here αi is the projection of α on the
i-th dimension.
(3.2) For each x ∈ X and y, z ∈ S(x), α(y) 6= α(z). Combined with (3.1), it means that for
some i ∈ ı(x), αi(y) 6= αi(z).
(3.3) For each x ∈ X with i ∈ ı(x) and each y, z ∈ S(x), |[y]αi | = |[z]αi |, where [y]αi :=
{y′ ∈ S(x) : αi(y′) = αi(y)}. Combined with (3.1) and (3.2), it implies that for each x ∈ X,
|S(x)| =∏i∈(x) |αi(S(x))|.
4. For each i ∈ I, Hi is a partition of Xi. For each x ∈ Xi, we use Hi(x) to denote equivalent
class in Hi containing x. We require that Hi(x) = Hi(y) implies αi(S(x)) = αi(S(y)). In the
following, we denote by αi(hi) the set of available actions of player i at information set hi.
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Extensive forms which allow simultaneous moves appear and play an essential role in Perea
[11]. Here we give it a formal formulation with some small modification. We call the model the
compact extensive form since it seems like that we eliminate redundant nodes and consolidate
simultaneous moves together in a standard extensive form (Selten [15], Kreps and Wilson[8]) . To
accommodate to the multiple-players-one-node situation, the action assignment function α assigns
to each non-initial node (or, equivalently, an edge) a profile of actions where for each player active
at the immediate predecessor node there is a concrete action, and for those inactive a dummy
symbol  meaning that he does not need to act. Instead of one edge representing one action for one
player and different edges represent distinct actions of her in the standard extensive game, here
different edges may represent the same action(s) for some player(s). In (3.2) we require that two
edges radiating from one decision node should represent distinct profiles, i.e., at least one player
active at that decision node should have different actions. Condition (3.3) describes that the edges
radiating from one decision node represent the different combinations of independent actions of
players active at that node. Finally, since there might be multiple players active at each node,
information sets could overlap.
It is easy to see that the standard extensive form is a special case of the compact one, i.e.,
|ı(x)| = 1 for every x ∈ X. In this sense, the notion of compact extensive form is a generalization
of the standard one.
Like the extensive form game, a compact extensive form game is obtained by specifying each
player i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : Z → R for terminal nodes.
In Figure 1, we show how a compact extensive form (game) looks like and compare it with the
standard one.
Figure 1: An extensive form game and its compactification
The graph in the left-hand side is adopted from Perea [12]’s Figure 1. The situation is, as Perea
[12] put it, “[a]t the beginning of the game, ∅, player 1 chooses between a and b, and player 2
simultaneously chooses between c and d. So, ∅ is an information set that belongs to both players 1
and 2. If player 1 chooses b, the game ends, and the utilities are as depicted. If he chooses a, then
the game moves to information set h21 or information set h22, depending on whether player 2 has
chosen c or d. Player 1, however, does not know whether player 2 has chosen c or d, so player 1
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faces information set h1 after choosing a. Hence h21 and h22 are information sets that belong only
to player 2, whereas h1 is an information set that belongs only to player 1.”
The graph in the middle is a representation of the situation by a (standard) extensive form
game. There, since simultaneous moves are not allowed, information set ∅ is decomposed into
∅1 and ∅2 which correspond to player 1 and 2’s information set at the beginning of the game
(to differentiate players, we use continuous-line circles to represent player 1’s information sets and
dashed-line circles to represent player 2’s information sets). Also, h1 and h21, h22 are displayed
separately.
The graph in the right-hand side represents the situation by a compact extensive form game.
Since simultaneous moves are allowed, each decision node represents a move for both players, and
informations sets overlap. Indeed, ∅1 and ∅2 coincide with each other, and h1 = h21 ∪ h22. Note
that each edge (i.e., each non-initial node) represents a vector of the active players’ choices. It can
be seen that this form is indeed more compact than the one in the middle, with the terminal nodes
unchanged.
Perfect recall can be defined similarly for compact extensive form games. Formally, each player
i in I has perfect recall iff the following condition is satisfied. For each x, y, y′ ∈ X with i ∈
ı(x)∩ ı(y)∩ ı(y′), if x < y and Hi(y) = Hi(y′), then there is x′ ∈ X such that P (y′)∩Hi(x) = {x′},
and if x = pn(y) and x
′ = pm(y′), αi(pn−1(y)) = αi(pm−1(y′)).
3. Compactifying Extensive Forms
We have defined the compact extensive form. In this section, we specify how to “compactify”
such a form. Also, we show some important features of the compactification process.
3.1. The compactification operation
Consider two compact extensive forms Γ = 〈T,≥; I, ı; {A}i∈I , α; {Hi}i∈I〉 and Γ′ = 〈T ′,≥′
; I, ı′; {A′}i∈I , α′; {H ′i}i∈I〉. For simplicity, we assume that for each x ∈ X, if i ∈ ı(x), then
S(x) /∈ Hi.1 We say that Γ′ is a compactification of Γ, denoted by Γ →COM Γ′, iff there exist
x, y1, ..., yk, z11, ..., z1`1 ,..., zk1,..., zk`k ∈ Z satisfying
1. S(x) = {y1, ..., yk} and S(yr) = {zr1, ..., zr`r} for each r = 1, ..., k.
2. There is some i ∈ I such that i ∈ ı(yr) for each r = 1, ..., k, and Hi(y1) = ... = Hi(yk) =
{y1, ..., yk}. We let b = |αi(S(y1))| = |αi(S(yr))| for each r = 1, ..., k). Without loss of generality,
we assume that for each r = 1, ..., k, αi(zr1) = ... = αi(zr,`r/b) = αi(z1,`1/b), αi (zr,(`r/b)+1) = ... =
αi(zr,2`1/b) = αi(z1,2`r/b), ..., αi(zr,`r−(`k/b)+1) = ... = αi(zr,`r) = αi(z1,`1).
3. T ′ is obtained from T by replacing Tx with the following subtree (i.e., T ′ − T ′x = T − Tx).
(3.1) We preserve x, and let S′(x) = {t11, ...t1b; t21, ..., t2b, ..., tk1, ..., tkb} where those trs (r =
1, ..., k, s = 1, ..., b) are symbols which do not belong to T.
(3.2) For each r = 1, .., k, if |ı(yr)| = 1 (i.e., ı(yr) = {i}), then `r = b. In this case, we
regard tr1, ..., trb as the same with zr1, ..., zr`r , and each subtree Tzrs can be directly “grafted”
to trs (s = 1, ..., b). If |ı(yr)| > 1, then `r > b and b is a divisor of `r. In this case, we let
S(tr1) = {zr1, ..., zr,`r/b}, S(tr2) = {zr,(`r\b)+1, ..., zr,2`r\b},..., S(trb) = {zr,`r−(`k/b)+1, ..., zr,`r}, and
the subtrees Tzrn are all preserved (n = 1, ..., `r).
1 This condition is satisfied when each player has perfect recall (and perhaps with some consolidation of redundant
actions like coalescing of information sets in Thompson [17]).
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4. For the player assignment function ′, ′(x) = (x)∪{i}. For each trs (r = 1, ..., k, s = 1, ..., b),
if |(yr)| = 1, then since we have stipulated that trs = zrs, it follows that ′(trs) = (zrs); if
|(yr)| > 1, then ′(trs) = (yr)\{i}.
5. For the set of actions {A′i}i∈I and action assignment function β′, since we have assumed that
for each x ∈ X, if i ∈ (x), then there is no hi ∈ Hi such that S(y) ⊆ hi, it follows that i /∈ (x),
i.e., for each yr (r = 1, ..., k), βi(yr) = . Let A
′
j = Aj for each j ∈ I. For each r = 1, ..., k and
s = 1, ..., b, let α′i(trs) = αi(z1,s`r\b) and α
′
j(trs) = αj(yr) for each j 6= i. Let α′j(t) = αj(t) for all
other nodes t and all j ∈ I.
6. For the information sets, let H ′i = (Hi\Hi(y1)) ∪ {{x}}, and in the following sometimes we
say that Hi(y1) is absorbed by/into x. For j 6= i, let
H ′j = (Hj\
k⋃
r=1
Hj(yr)) ∪
k⋃
r=1
(Hj(yr)\{y1, ..., yk}) ∪ ⋃
s:ys∈Hj(yr)
{ts1, ..., tsb}
 (1)
In the above formula, we manipulate that Hj(yr) = ∅ if j 6= ι(yr) for each r = 1, ..., k.
One property of the compactification operation is that it has no influence on the “grandsons”
of x, i.e., the nodes z with p2(z) = x (with respect to isomorphism). Hence it implies that a com-
pactification operation does not alter the terminal nodes and, consequently, any utility functions.
Here we use an example to illustrate the compactification operation.
Figure 2: Compactifying an extensive form
Consider the (standard) extensive form on the left-hand side of Figure 2. There are three
players. Player 1 moves at first, choosing a or b. Player 2 moves without knowing player 1’s choice,
and he can choose either c or d. It turns out that if player 1 chooses b, then the game terminates
after player 2 makes a choice, while if player 1 chooses a, then after player 2’s move it is player
3’s turn. Player 3 knows what player 1 has chosen yet does not know player 2’s choice. The game
terminates after player 3 makes up his choice.
Here, player 3’s two decision nodes in h3 can be absorbed by their immediate predecessor, i.e.,
the node on the left-hand side in player 2’s information set h2. By doing this, the number of edges
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radiating from that node increases from two to four since now each edge represents a pair of player
2 and 3’s actions. Now we obtain the compact extensive form in the middle.
Further, we can combine player 2’s information set h2 with player 1’s h1. Now four edges radiate
from the root which is occupied by both players 1 and 2. Note that h3 cannot be absorbed by the
root since h3 does not contain all immediate predecessors of the root node. In the reduced form on
the right-hand side, h3 now contains two nodes which represent player 1’s action a and player 2’s
two actions. This faithfully describes player 3’s knowledge at h3: he knows that player 1’s action
is a, yet he has no idea on player 2’s choice.
The following proposition states that perfect recall is preserved in the compactification opera-
tion.
Proposition 1. (Preservation of perfect recall) Consider two compact extensive forms Γ and
Γ′ with Γ→COM Γ′. If every player has perfect recall in Γ, then so does everyone in Γ′.
Another problem concerns epistemic game theorists is the unambiguity of the order among
information sets. Consider a compact extensive form Γ = 〈T,≥; I, ı; {A}i∈I , α; {Hi}i∈I〉 and two
information sets h and h′ (they may belong to different players). We say that h is followed by h′
(or h′ follows h), denoted by h  h′, iff there is x ∈ h and y ∈ h′ such that x is on the unique
path from the root to y. We say that h and h′ are simultaneous, denoted by h ∼ h′, iff h∩ h′ 6= ∅.
An information set h is weakly followed by h′ (or h′ weakly follows h), denoted by h % h′, iff
h is followed by h′ or they are simultaneous. We say the order among the information sets is
unambiguous iff for every information sets h, h′, if h - h′, then it does not hold that h  h′.
The unambiguity of the order among information sets is vital in dynamic epistemic game theory.
The algorithm which screens out strategies that is optimal to common belief in the opponents’
future rationality, called backward dominance procedure, works if and only if the information sets
are ordered unambiguously. Hence it is relevant to consider whether the compactitification process
preserves the unambiguity of the order among information sets. The following statement gives a
positive answer.
Proposition 2. (Preservation of unambiguity of the order among information sets)
Consider two compact extensive forms Γ and Γ′ with Γ→COM Γ′. If Γ has an unambiguous order
among information sets, then so does Γ′.
3.2. The compactification process and its properties
Figure 2 actually shows a compactification process. Indeed, the operation can be applied
repeatedly, and we can obtain a compactification sequence. Formally, let Γ be a compact extensive
form. A compactification process from Γ is a sequence 〈Γ0,Γ1, ...,Γm〉 where Γ0 = Γ, for each
r = 0, ...,m− 1, Γr →COM Γr+1, and Γm can not be compactified anymore. A compact extensive
form is said to be minimal iff it cannot be compactified any more.
The problem of the compactification process is that it is not order-independent. In Figure 3
we give an example. Consider the extensive form on the left-hand side. The symbols A, ..., N
represent the terminal nodes. We give two compactification processes from it. In the process on
the top, first the four nodes in h′1 are absorbed by the node on the left-hand side of h2 (as well
as h3). Then the three nodes in h2 are absorbed by the root. In the process on the button, in
contrast, the absorption of h2 is conducted first. However, this makes the compactification process
inable to continue, since now no node has its immediate successors in one information set. It is
clear that the two processes have distinct terminal terms.
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Figure 3: Order-dependence of the compactification process
Though order-independence does not hold in general, by peering closely at Figure 3, one may
notice that the process on the top makes the original extensive form more compact, i.e., one more
information set is absorbed. Here we define a compactification process which absorbs at least as
many informations sets as any other process. We start from the nodes next to the terminal nodes,
i.e., {y ∈ X : S(y) ⊆ Z} and check whether some of them can be absorbed by their immdiate
predecessor, if so, then conduct the compactification operation on them. When all compactification
is done for those nodes, we go to the nodes next to them, etc. We call it a leaves-to-root (LTR)
compactification process. We have the following statement.
Proposition 3. (LTR process absorbs more information sets) Consider the LTR compact-
ification process and an arbitrary compactification processes from a compact extensive form Γ. If
an information set in Γ is absorbed in the latter, then so it is in the former.
For each compact extensive form Γ, we use COM(Γ) to denote the set of all compact extensive
forms (not necessarily minimal) which can be reached through a compactification process from Γ.
Let Γ∗ be a minimal compact extensive form. We define [Γ∗] =
⋃{COM(Γ) : Γ∗ is the terminal
term of the LTR compactification process from Γ}. Each Γ′ ∈ [Γ∗] can be said as related to Γ∗
via some compactification process; either it is a compact extensive form which has Γ∗ as the final
term of the LTR process, like the one on the left-hand side of Figure 3, or it can be reached via a
compactification process from another compact extensive form which reaches Γ∗ through the LTR
process (thought itself may not be able to reach Γ∗), like the terminal term on the bottom process
in Figure 3.
As we mentioned in Section 3.1, compactification operations have no influence on the terminal
nodes. Hence any utility function applied to one Γ′ ∈ [Γ∗] can be applied to any compact extensive
form in [Γ∗] without any alteration.
4. Compactification and Belief in the Opponents’ Future Rationality
We have developed the compact extensive form as a faithful representation of the actual chrono-
logical order of the moves in Perea [12], a notion essential for the application of backward dominance
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procedure which screens out strategies optimal to types with common belief in future rationality.
This section discuss this relationship between compactification process and belief in the opponents’
future rationality in detail.
Consider a compact extensive form game G = (Γ, {ui}i∈I), where Γ = 〈T,≥; I, ; {A}i∈I ,
β; {Hi}i∈I〉 is a compact extensive form and for each i ∈ I, ui is player i’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function for terminal nodes. An information set hi ∈ Hi is called initial for
player i iff for any x ∈ hi and any y < x, there is no h′i ∈ Hi such that y ∈ h′i. A strategy for player
i is a function si : Ĥi →
⋃
hi∈Ĥi βi(hi) which assigns each hi ∈ Ĥi⊆ Hi a choice si(hi) ∈ βi(hi)
satisfying
(1) Every initial information set of i belongs to Ĥi, and
(2) Ĥi = Hi(si), where Hi(si) is the information sets that strategy si allows for.
Consider an information set h. We adopt the following symbols from Perea [12]:
S(h) := {(si)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I Si : (si)i∈I reaches some node in h},
Si(h) := {si ∈ Si : (si, s−i) ∈ S(h) for some s−i ∈ S−i},
S−i(h) := {s−i ∈ S−i : (si, s−i) ∈ S(h) for some si ∈ Si}.
Consider a compact extensive form game G = (Γ, {ui}i∈I).An epistemic model for G is a tuple
M = (Ti, bi)i∈I where for each i ∈ I,
(1) Ti is a finite set of types for player i,
(2) bi is a function that assigns to every type ti ∈ Ti, and every information set hi ∈ Hi, a
probability distribution bi(ti, hi) ∈ ∆(S−i(hi)× T−i).
Consider a type ti, a strategy si, and an information set hi ∈ Hi(si). By ui(si, ti|hi) we denote
the expected utility from choosing si under the conditional belief that ti holds at hi. Strategy si is
optimal for type ti iff ui(si, ti|hi) ≥ ui(s′i, ti|hi) for all s′i ∈ Si(hi). Strategy si is rational for a type
ti iff si is optimal for ti at every hi ∈ Hi(si).
Consider a type ti, an information set hi ∈ Hi, and an opponent j 6= i. Type i believes at hi in
j’s future rationality iff bi(ti, hi) only assigns positive probability to j’s strategy-type pairs (sj , tj)
where sj is optimal for tj at every hj ∈ Hj(sj) that weakly follows hi. Type ti believes in the
opponents’ future rationality iff at every hi ∈ Hi, type ti believes in every opponents’ rationality.
Consider a compact extensive form game G and an epistemic model M = (Ti, bi)i∈I for G.
Initial step. Define for every player i the set of types
T 1i = {ti ∈ Ti : ti believes in the opponents’ future rationality}
Inductive step. Let k ≥ 2, and suppose that T k−1i has been defined for all player i. Then,
we define
T ki = {ti ∈ T k−1i : bi(ti, hi)(S−i × T k−1−i ) = 1 for all hi ∈ Hi}.
A type ti expresses common belief in future rationality iff ti ∈ T ki for every k.
A strategy can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality iff there is some
epistemic model M = (Tj , bj)j∈I and some type ti ∈ Ti such that ti expresses common belief in
future rationality and si is rational for ti.
We have the following statement
Theorem 4. (Minimal form and the smallest set of rational strategies) Let Γ∗be a min-
imal compact extensive form and (ui)i∈I a vector of utility functions for each players on the ter-
minal nodes of Γ∗. A strategy can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality
in (Γ∗, (ui)i∈I) if and only if for each Γ ∈ [Γ∗], it can rationally be chosen under common belief in
future rationality in (Γ, (ui)i∈I).
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5. Concluding Remarks: An Alternative Compactification
In the definition of compactification in Section 3.1, we require that the immediate successors
of x form an information set for some player i, i.e., Hi(y1) = ... = Hi(yk) = {y1, ..., yk}. It might
be wondered why we did not follow Thompson [17]’s interchange of decision nodes faithfully and
require only Hi(y1) = ... = Hi(yk). Technically, it is possible, and the definition of compactification
can be preserved except that, in term 6, we have to define
H ′i = (Hi\Hi(y1)) ∪ {(Hi(y1)\{y1, ..., yk}) ∪ {x}}. (2)
We call it a Thompson compactification (T-compactification), denoted by Γ →TCOM Γ′. This
definition allows that only some nodes in an information set, instead of the whole set, are absorbed.
The advantage of T-compactification is that the process is order-independence. Formally, we have
the following statement.
Proposition 5. (Order-independence of T-compactification process) Consider a compact
extensive form Γ and two T-compactification processes 〈Γ0,Γ1, ...,Γm〉 and 〈Γ′0,Γ′1, ...,Γ′n〉 from Γ.
Then Γm = Γ
′
n.
However, on the other hand, T-compactification has a severe disadvantage: the partial absorp-
tion may reverse the order of two information sets, sometimes even destroy the unambiguity of the
order. Figure 4 gives an example.
Figure 4: Change of the unambiguity of the order between information sets
On the left-hand side of Figure 4 is a fragment of some game. The symbols A, ...,M represent
the continuation of the game. Only player 1’s information set h1 and player 2’s h2 are depicted
with h2 unambiguously follows h1, and all other nodes belong to players other than 1 and 2. It can
be seen that four nodes in h2 can be absorbed by their immediate predecessors respectively, and we
obtain the fragment in the middle. Now, h2 is simultaneous with h1 and follows h1. Further, the two
nodes on the left-hand side in h2 in the middle can be absorbed by their immediate predecessor, and
we obtained the fragment on the right-hand side. Here, the unambiguity of the order between h1
and h2 is destroyed; indeed, h2 follows h1 and is also followed by h1, which obfuscates the meaning
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of “future” for moves in h1 and makes it impossible to apply Perea [12]’s backward dominance
procedure.
The requirement of absorption of the whole information set can avoid this difficulty. Yet it
is difficult to deny the validity of combining only some nodes in an information set since the
strategic features of the original game seems invariant in this process. Perhaps we can consider
some restrictions on the original game which guarantee the preservation of the unambiguity of
the order of the information sets, for example, every two nodes in an information set should have
experienced the same history in the sense of information sets, i.e., if the path to one node passes
an information set h, so does the other. More research is expected in this direction.
6. Proofs
6.1. Preservation of perfect recall
In this subsection, we will prove Proposition 1 in Section 3.1. First, it can be seen that a
compactification operation can be characterized by a pair (x, i) where x is the node which absorbs
an information set constitute by its immediate successors and i is the player who possesses that
information set. Hence for each compact form Γ = 〈T,≥; I, ı; {A}i∈I , α; {Hi}i∈I〉, each x ∈ X, and
each i ∈ I with S(x) ∈ Hi, we can define ψ(Γ; (x, i)) to be the compact extensive form obtained
from Γ via the compactification operation where player i’s information set S(x) ∈ Hi is absorbed
by x. Conversely, for each Γ,Γ′ with Γ→COM Γ′, there exist uniquely x ∈ X and i ∈ I such that
Γ′ = ψ(Γ; (x, i)).
Consider a compact extensive form Γ which satisfies perfect recall, and Γ′ = ψ(Γ; (x, i)). Let
y, z, z′ ∈ X with j ∈ ı(y)∩ ı(z)∩ ı(z′), y < z, and Hj(z) = Hj(z′). It can be seen straightforwardly
that condition for perfect recall is satisfied in Γ′ if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i)
j 6= i; (ii) y, z, z′ and x are on different subtrees; (iii) Hi(z) > x, (iv) pn(y) = x with n ≥ 2. The
reason is, in each case, the compactification has no essential effect on the configuration of the tree
between y and z, z′.
Hence we only need to consider the case where j = i, y, z, z′ and x are on the same sub-tree,
and x = p1(y) or y < x.
2 Suppose that x = p1(y). Since the original Γ satisfies perfect recall, there
is some y′ ∈ Hi(y) leading to z′ via the same action as y for z. After the compactification, y′ and y
are both absorbed into x, it can be seen that in Γ′, now z and z′ are reached from x (now Hi(y) is
replaced by {x}) through two edges sharing the same action of i. For the case of y < x, it is easy to
see that the existence of y′ and the action from it leading to z′ is invariant in the compactification.
Here we have shown that perfect recall is satisfied in Γ′.
6.2. Preservation of unambiguity of the order among information sets
In this subsection, we will show Proposition 2 in Section 3.1. Consider two compact ex-
tensive form Γ and Γ′ with Γ′ = ψ(Γ; (x, i)). It can be seen that for each j ∈ I, there is a
bijection %j from Hj to H
′
j . Indeed, using the symbols in the definition of the compactifica-
tion in Section 3.1, %i(Hi(y1)) = {x}, and for each j 6= i with j ∈ ı(yr) for some yr ∈ S(x),
%j(Hj(yr)) = (Hj(yr)\{y1, ..., yk}) ∪
⋃
s:ys∈Hj(yr){ts1, ..., tsb}, and for every other information set,
since it is preserved in the compactification, %i maps it to itself.
2 Here the case y = x is impossible since it goes against our assumption that if i ∈ ı(x), then S(x) ∈ Hi. Also,
the relation between Hi(z) and x is not essential here.
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Suppose that the information sets in Γ are ordered unambiguously. To see whether the unam-
biguity is preserved in Γ′, we only need to consider those information sets hj with %j(hj) 6= hj . It is
easy to see that Hi(y1) does not cause any trouble, because in Γ
′ it is degenerated into a singleton.
For every j 6= i with j ∈ ı(yr) for some yr ∈ S(x), since the only difference between Hj(yr) and
%j(Hj(yr)) is that every ys ∈ Hj(yr) with ys ∈ S(x) is now replaced by a group of doppelgangers
ts1, ..., tsb, the order between Hj(yr) and any information set other than Hi(y1) in Γ is preserved in
Γ′ (we only need to replace Hj(yr) by %j(Hj(yr))). Also, it is clear that {x}  %j(Hj(yr)). Here,
we have shown that the order of information sets in Γ′ are ordered unambiguously.
Through the proof above, it can be seen that the order of information sets are weakly preserved
in the compactification operation. Formally, we have the following statement.
Corollary 6. (Weak preservation of the order of information sets) Consider two compact
extensive forms Γ,Γ′ with Γ →COM Γ′ and two information sets hi, h′j in Γ. If hi ≺ h′j , then
%i(hi) - %j(h′j).
6.3. The effeciency of the LTR process
In this subsection we show Proposition 3 in Section 3. Suppose that some information set h
is absorbed in some compactification process but not in the LTR process. The reason can only
be that some information set smaller than h (i.e., nearer to the root) is absorbed before. Yet it
is contradictory to the definition of “leaf to root”. Hence LTR process absorbs at least as many
information sets as any other compactification process.
Also, it will be shown in Section 6.5 that, even for those processes with which LTR shares the
same terminal term, LTR is at least as fast as any of them. In summary, we can say that LTR is
the most efficient compactification process.
6.4. Minimal compact extensive form and backward dominance procedure
In this subsection we show Theorem 4 in Section 4. We need an algorithm called backward
dominance procedure defined in Perea [12].
For a given information set h, a subset Λ(h) ⊆ S(h) is called a decision problem at h iff for
every active player i at h there are some Di ⊆ Si(h) and D−i ⊆ S−i(h) such that Λ(h) = Di×D−i.
Consider an information set h, a player i who is active at h, and a decision problem Λ(h) = Di×D−i
at h. We say that a strategy si ∈ Di is strictly dominated within the decision problem Λ(h) iff
there is some randomized strategy µi ∈ ∆(Di) such that ui(µi,s−i) > ui(si, s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i.
By sdi(Λ(h)) we denote the set of strategies in Di that are strictly dominated within Λ(h) for the
active player i. Similarly, we define
sd(Λ(h)) = {(sj)j∈I ∈ Λ(h) : si ∈ sdi(Λ(h)) for some i that is active at h} (3)
The backward dominance procedure is defined as follows:
Initial step. For every information set h, let Λ0(h) = S(h);
Inductive step. Let k ≥ 1, and suppose that Λk−1(h) has been defined for every information
set h. Then, at every information set h we define
Λk(h) = Λk−1(h)\
⋃
h′≥h
sd(Λk−1(h′)) (4)
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A strategy si survives the backward dominance procedure iff there is some s−i ∈ S−i such that
(si, s−i) ∈ Λk(ho) for each k ∈ N. Here ho is the information set which contains (only) the root.
Perea [12] showed the following result (also see Perea [11]).
Lemma 7. (Strategies surviving the backward dominance procedure) Player i can ratio-
nally choose si under common belief in future rationality if and only if si survives the backward
dominance procedure.
Based on Corollary 6, we can show the following statetement.
Lemma 8. (Decrease of strategies surviving the backward dominance procedure in a
compactification) Consider compact extensive forms Γ,Γ′ with Γ →COM Γ′, and a vector of
utility functions (ui)i∈I . If si survives the backward dominance procedure in (Γ′, (ui)i∈I), so it does
in (Γ, (ui)i∈I).
Indeed, through a compactification operation, an information set h which used to follow another
information set h′ is now simultaneous with h′, which may lead to that more strategies in some
Si(h) as well as strategies reaching some information sets before h and h
′ to be eliminated. Based
on this lemma, it is easy to see by mathematical induction that, if Γ is the final term of some LTR
process from Γ′, then every si survives the backward dominance procedure in Γ, so it does in Γ′.
In other words, if a strategy si does not survive the procedure for some compact extensive form,
then si does not survive in the terminal of the LTR process from it.
Consider a minimal compact extensive form Γ∗, some Γ from which the LTR process leads to
Γ∗, and some Γ′ which is the terminal term of a compactification process from Γ. Remember that
we have shown in Proposition 3 that for every information set, if it is absorbed in Γ′, then so it does
in Γ∗. For simplicity, we assume that at each node, each player has more than two actions. It can be
seen that (1) every information set in Γ can be absorbed for at most one time, and it is determined
that to where they are absorbed. (2) If Γ′ 6= Γ∗, it is because in the compactification process from
Γ to Γ′, some information set h is absorbed while some other information set h′ following it is still
not absorbed and is not able to absorbed due to the absorption of h. Therefore, Γ′ can be informally
said as a “incomplete” version of Γ∗. Hence, similarly to the argument in the previous paragraph,
it can be seen that every strategy which does not survive the backward dominance procedure in
Γ′does not survive the procedure in Γ∗. Combined with Lemma 8, it follows that the statement
holds for any middle term in any compactification process from Γ. Hence, we have shown the only
if part of Theorem 4.
The if part of Theorem 4 holds straightforwardly since Γ∗ itself belongs to [Γ∗]. Here we have
shown Theorem 4.
6.5. Order-independence of the T-compactification process
In this subsection we show Proposition 5 in Section 5, i.e., the order independence of the T-
compactification process. We use a lemma proved in Newman [9] (also see Apt [1]) which gives a
sufficient condition for order-independence in an abstract reduction system.
An abstract reduction system is a pair (Θ,→), where Θ is a non-empty set and → is a binary
relation on Θ. An element θ ∈ Θ is called an endpoint in (Θ,→) if there is no θ′ ∈ Θ such that
θ → θ′. We say that {θn : n = 0, 1, ...} (it can be finite or infinite) is a →-sequence in (Θ,→) iff
θn ∈ Θ for each n and θn → θn+1 (as far as θn+1 is defined). We use→∗ to denote the reflexive and
transitive closure of → . We say that (X,→) is weakly confluent iff for each θ, η, ζ ∈ Θ, if θ → η
and θ → ζ, then there is some θ′ ∈ Θ such that η →∗ θ′ and ζ →∗ θ′.
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Lemma 9. (Newman’s lemma) If an abstract reduction system (X,→) satisfies the following
two conditions: (N1) each →-sequence is finite, and (N2) (X,→) is weakly confluent, then for
each θ ∈ Θ there is a unique endpoint θ′ ∈ Θ such that θ →∗ θ′.
The set of all compact extensive forms and →TCOM form an abstract reduction system. Since
a T-compactification operation does not generate new information set which can be absorbed by
its immediate predecessor, is straightforward to see that each →TCOM -sequence is finite. Hence,
by Newman’s lemma, to show that the T-compactification process is order-independent, we only
need to show that weak confluence is satisfied.
First, it can be seen that a T-ompactification operation can still be characterized by a pair
(x, i) where x is the node which absorbs an information set constitute by its immediate successors
and i is the player who possesses that information set. So here we abuse the symbol and still
use ψ(Γ; (x, i)) to show what is changed in a T-compactification on Γ. Consider three compact
extensive forms Γ,Γ′,Γ′′ with Γ′ = ψ(Γ; (x, i)) and Γ′′ = ψ(Γ; (y, j)).Intuitively, it can be seen
easily that if x and y are “far” from each other, then for each form we just repeat the operation
that leads to the other and we can obtain the same outcome. Formally, if x and y are on different
subtrees (i.e., neither x ≤ y nor y ≤ x) or x = pk(y) with k ≥ 2 (or symmetrically y = pk(x) with
k ≥ 2), then since the two T-compactification operations do not influence each other and both x,
S(x) and y, S(y) are preserved in Γ′′,Γ′respectively, we have ψ(Γ′; (y, j)) = ψ(Γ′′; (x, i)).
Suppose that x = y (i.e., x = p0(y)). If i = j, then Γ
′ = Γ′′. Consider the case that i 6= j. It
means that S(x) ∈ Hi and S(x) ∈ Hj . By the equation (1) in the definition of T-compactification in
Section 5, x is preserved in Γ′ and Γ′′, and S′(x) ∈ Hj and S′′(x) ∈ Hi. Hence we can further com-
bine S′(x) with x in Γ′ and S′′(x) with x in Γ′′, and it can be seen that ψ(Γ′; (y, j)) = ψ(Γ′′; (x, i)).
Finally, suppose that x = p1(y). By our assumption, in this case i 6= j. When |ı(y)| = 1
(i.e, ı(y) = {i}), it can be seen that ψ(Γ′′; (x, i)) = Γ′. Suppose that |ı(y)| > 1. We still use the
symbols used in Section 3 and let b = |αi(S(y))|. In Γ′, now y is “replaced” by dummies t1, ..., tb, and⋃b
r=1 S
′(tr) ⊆ hj for some hj in Hj . Hence we can make each tr to absorb S(tr). On the other hand,
in Γ′′, x still can absorb S′′(x) (= S(x)). It can be seen that ψ(...ψ(ψ(Γ′; (t1, j)); (t2, j))...; (tb, j)) =
ψ(Γ′′; (x, i)).3 Here we have shown that condition (N2) in Newman’s lemma is satisfied, that is,
we have shown that T-composition process is order-independent.
Though the terminal term is invariant among different T-compactification processes, it can
be seen from the above proof that the LTR process is the fastest one. Indeed, the outcome
that LTR process can achieve in two steps if we start from the node which is “nearer” to the
terminal nodes (i.e., y).If we start from the farther one (i.e., x), then it costs b times of operation.
Therefore, LTR process still has its distinct value from the viewpoint of algorithmic complexity for
T-compactification.
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